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Abstract. The rapid technology upgrades of mobile devices and the popular-
ity of wireless networks significantly drive the emergence and development of
Location-based Services (LBSs), thus greatly expanding the business of online
services and enriching the user experience. However, the personal location data
shared with the service providers also leave hidden risks on location privacy. Lo-
cation anonymization techniques transform the exact location of a user into a
cloaking area by including the locations of multiple users in the exposed area such
that the exposed location is indistinguishable from that of the other users. How-
ever in such schemes, location information once perturbed cannot be recovered
from the cloaking region and as a result, users of the location cannot obtain fine
granular information even when they have access to it. In this paper, we propose
Dynamic Reversible Cloaking (DRC) a new de-anonymziable location cloaking
mechanism that allows to restore the actual location from the perturbed infor-
mation through the use of an anonymization key. Extensive experiments using
realistic road network traces show that the proposed scheme is efficient, effective
and scalable.
1 Introduction
With the popularity of mobile positioning devices and the wide emergence of location-
based services (LBSs), we are witnessing a rapid development of mobile location-based
applications. Through location-aware techniques (e.g. GPS, wireless access point), users
can acquire personalized services based on their current location. Examples of such ser-
vices include weather forecast, traffic condition updates, location-based travel services
and emergency care. The richness and diversity of location-based services has dramati-
cally improved the quality of life for people. However, these services and benefits also
come with a hidden cost: the intrusion of location privacy. For example, knowing the
haunts of users during the day time and at nights, an attacker can infer a user’s social
activities, religious beliefs and political views. Moreover, with the advent of big data
and big data analytics, the risk of disclosing location information is further exacerbated
as an adversary can correlate the exposed location with information from various data
sources to infer more accurate and fine-grained information about individuals.
Various techniques have been proposed to achieve location privacy protection in
mobile location-based system. Location anonymization refers to the process of trans-
forming the exact location of a user to a cloaking area by including the location of
multiple other users. A user is considered to be location k-anonymous if and only if her
location information is indistinguishable from that of at least k − 1 other users. How-
ever in such schemes, location information once perturbed cannot be recovered from
the cloaking region and as a result, users of the location cannot obtain fine granular
information even when they have access to it. In several access controlled scenarios,
such as when some users of the location have more privileges than the others, it may
be desirable to obtain fine granular location information from the exposed perturbed
location when the data user has access to the finer granular location information.
During the last several years, many location anonymization techniques[1, 6, 8, 10,
13, 20] have been proposed. Most of them were developed as unidirectional cloaking
techniques without considering the ability to de-anonymize the perturbed data. In this
paper, we propose Dynamic Reversible Cloaking (DRC) a new de-anonymziable loca-
tion cloaking mechanism that allows to restore the actual location from the perturbed
information through the use of an anonymization key. Our proposed mechanism uses an
anonymization secret key to uniquely generate a cloaking region which allows the orig-
inal location data to be restored from the cloaked data using the secret key, However,
without the secret key, the original data cannot be inferred even when the adversary has
complete knowledge of the cloaking mechanism.
We organize the rest of the paper as follows: In Section 2, we present the required
background. In Section 3, we introduce the proposed Dynamic Reversible Cloaking. In
Section 4, we analyze the experiment results. We discuss related work in Section 5 and
we conclude in Section 6.
2 Overview of Concepts and Framework
In this section, we discuss the road network model used for the cloaking process and
introduce the conventional location cloaking mechanisms to protect location privacy
over road networks. We then define the de-anonymizable location privacy problem and
introduce the evaluation metrics used in this paper.
Fig. 1: Road network model with de-anonymizable privacy controlled framework
A road network can be modeled as a graph G = (VG, EG), consisting of a set
of junctions, VG, and a set of road segments, EG. Figure 1 shows an example with
14 junctions and 16 segments respectively. In our work, junctions are defined as the
crossover or end points of roads while segments are defined as the direct roads between
adjacent junctions. We assume that all mobile users move along the segments. The
raw location information of the mobile users is sent with their customizable privacy
requirements to a trusted third-party location anonymizer, which transforms the raw
location into a cloaking region preserving the required privacy properties, which may
then be shared with other untrusted location-based service providers.
The location information of a user is said to be k-anonymous if the location infor-
mation is indistinguishable from the location information of at least k-1 other users. Ob-
viously, the larger the value k, the better is the privacy protection that can be achieved.
However, large cloaking regions typically provide lower utility as it increases the com-
plexity of the operations involved in obtaining an accurate answer to the location-based
query [13]. Therefore, to bound the size of the cloaking region, the customizable re-
quirements contain not only the privacy requirement, denoted by δk, but also the max-
imum spatial resolution level, denoted by σs [13, 19], which defines the maximum ac-
ceptable size of the cloaking region. The customizable privacy requirements with both
the two parameters are organized as the user-defined privacy profile: (δk, σs).
In the past, several models have been proposed for location anonymization. Ran-
dom sampling is a basic location cloaking technique that picks segments from the
whole graph one by one in a random manner while road-network-based expansion se-
lects adjacent segments of the cloaking region to make the structure of cloaking region
tighter [19]. However, to the best of our knowledge, in most existing location privacy-
preserving mechanisms, the original exact location information once perturbed in the
cloaking scheme cannot be restored to infer finer location information when users have
the required access privileges. The focus of our work in this paper is developing a new
de-anonymizable cloaking technique that can support privacy control in access con-
trolled scenarios. In such cases, the location privacy of users is protected while allowing
only the parties with the required permission to access finer information.
In the proposed de-anonymizable location privacy model, only the data users who
possess the permission to access finer information get the secret key to de-anonymize
the data. Such data users can de-anonymize the perturbed location using the secret key.
A detailed example is shown in Figure 1. The segment s11 contains the actual user.
Using the secret key, {s6, s8, s9, s10, s14} are added to reach the privacy level δk. To
de-anonymize the cloaking region, the same secret key is used to exactly identify and
remove the segments {s6, s8, s9, s10, s14} from the cloaking region, thus reducing the
perturbed location to the actual segment of the user.
To evaluate the performance of de-anonymizable cloaking scheme, multiple metrics
are required. Four metrics are used in this paper.
Anonymization Time: The time required to cloak the location information of the
user. A shorter anonymization time indicates higher effectiveness.
De-anonymization Time: The time required to de-anonymize the cloaking area to
get the exact location information of the user. Like anonymization time, a shorter de-
anonymization time indicates higher effectiveness.
Relative Spatial Resolution (RSR): This metric reflects the relationship between the
maximum spatial area defined by σs and the cloaking area. Specifically, the maximum
spatial area is a rectangular area centering on the user. Its lateral and vertical lengths
are provided by σs = {MLl,MLv}. For the cloaking space, its area is also abstracted
as a rectangle. The lateral and vertical distances between each pair of segments within
the cloaking space are calculated and the largest two values, expressed as {CLl, CLv},
are considered as the lateral and vertical lengths of the cloaking rectangle. Therefore,
considering a set of LBS requests with N elements, the RSR is defined as:
RSR =
1
N
∑
N
√
MLl ×MLv
CLl × CLv
Since the RSR is the square root of the ratio between maximum spatial area and cloak-
ing area, a higher value of RSR indicates a smaller cloaking space required to satisfy
the δk, meaning higher effectiveness.
Success Rate: This metric represents the rate of successful cloaking of the requests.
For a set Q of LBS requests, the cloaking area of each query q is represented by Cq =
f(q). A parameter S is 1 if the process is successful and 0 if the process is failed. The
success rate can be defined as:
Success Rate =
|{Cq | Cq = f(q), q ∈ Q, S = 1}|
|Q|
3 De-anonymizable Location Cloaking
In this section, we present the proposed dynamic reversible cloaking algorithm that
forms cloaked location regions containing tightly structured segments meeting the re-
quired k anonymity level. In this scheme, the anonymization and de-anonymization
processes can be considered as two inverse transition strings controlled by the secret
key. Specifically, during the two processes, the exchange of segments can be seen as
forward and backward transitions between two set of segments, namely the set of seg-
ments within the cloaking region and the set of adjacent segments of the cloaking re-
gion. Therefore, the two processes are sequences of continuous n − 1 forward and
backward transitions respectively, which are the inverse of each other. Since there are
multiple transition choices, a secret key is used as the transition controller. With the
key, both the forward and backward transition strings are determinate and reversible.
Without the key, the two transition strings become random and irreversible.
Fig. 2: Dynamic reversible cloaking
We describe the process with an example presented in Figure 2. For each transition,
the number of cloaked segments |C| and adjacent segments |A| are found. For exam-
ple, suppose in Figure 1, we have C = {s8, s9, s11} and A = {s6, s10, s14} so that
|C| ≤ |A|. For each addition or removal step, we assign IDs to all the potential forward
and backward transitions between the two sets to distinguish them. These IDs, called
transition IDs (TIDs), are organized in a transition table. In Figure 2, s8, s9, s11 within
C and s6, s10, s14 within A are mapped to the three rows and three columns respec-
tively in the order of segment length so that the shortest segments are mapped to the 1st
row and 1st column. The TID in table cell (i, j) associated with ith row and jth column
is computed by ((i − 1) + (j − 1)) mod |A| to make sure no same value is generated
in the same row or column. The anonymization key is used to generate a sequence of
pseudo-random numbers. The ith pseudo-random number uniquely determines a value
for both the ith forward transition and {n− i}th backward transition. This value, called
picked TID, can be calculated by pi = Ri mod |A| and it is used to select the transition
with the TID value same as the picked TID.
However, in the case |C| > |A|, since the number of potential backward transitions
is larger than the number of available TIDs, the same TID may be assigned to multiple
backward transitions, called a collision. Once a collision occurs, the key may fail to
distinguish the transitions with same TID and select the backward transition unmatched
with the forward transition. In general, collisions during cloaking expansion can be
dealt with two approaches. By carefully managing the assignment of TIDs before the
anonymization, collisions can be eliminated so that the de-anonymization process can
automatically run in a collision-free manner [12]. In this paper, we adopt a different
scheme based on using metadata information for collision-resolution. In this approach,
the collisions are not eliminated during cloaking expansion but recorded as part of the
metadata, which is then used in the de-anonymization process to resolve the collisions.
Suppose in Figure 1, we get C = {s8, s9, s11, s14} andA = {s6, s10, s13}. After estab-
lishing the table, same TIDs are seen in each column, as shown in Figure 2. To handle
such scenarios, in the cloaking process, additional segments, called null segments are
added to the set A to make |C| = |A|. The null segments are not real segments that
can be found in the graph and they are conceptual segments used to deal with the col-
lisions during transition. In this example, one null segment is set, denoted by sn. By
adding this null segment, we get |C| = |A| = 4, and therefore the transitions become
free of collisions. However, if the null segment is picked as the next added segment
during the anonymization process, that pseudo-random number should be skipped. The
information of this skipped pseudo-random numbers is recorded as metadata, which is
a binary stream matched with the pseudo-random stream. Each bit is 0 for non-skipped
pseudo-random numbers and 1 for skipped ones. After anonymization, the metadata is
encrypted by the secret key and shared with the key to the user of the location data. The
user uses the metadata to identify and remove the skipped pseudo-random numbers to
do a collision-free de-anonymization.
In the next section, we present our experimental results to evaluate the performance
and effectiveness of the proposed scheme.
4 Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we first briefly describe the experimental setup and then present our
experimental results to evaluate the dynamic reversible cloaking algorithm.
4.1 Experimental setup
In our experiments, we use the GTMobiSim mobile trace generator [9] to generate a
realistic road network trace on the map of northwest part of Atlanta with 6979 junctions
and 9187 segments. 10000 cars are randomly generated along the roads, which then
move to random destinations through shortest paths on the road network. We implement
three different location anonymization schemes namely random sampling (RS), road-
network expansion (RNE) represented by the XStar technique in [19] and our proposed
dynamic reversible cloaking (DRC).
4.2 Experimental results
To evaluate the three schemes, we measure the anonymization and de-anonymization
time, relative spatial resolution and success rate. Our results show that the proposed
dynamic reversible cloaking algorithm is effective and scalable.
(a) Anonymization time (b) De-anonymization time
(c) Relative spatial resolution (d) Success rate
Fig. 3: Performance with varying anonymity level
We evaluate the effectiveness of the algorithms by varying the k-anonymity level
from 10 to 100. Figure 3(a) presents the results of the anonymization time. Higher
anonymity level results in longer anonymization time because it requires more seg-
ments to be put into the cloaking region. Since the DRC scheme is reversible and
generates a stream of pseudo-random values to drive the anonymization process, its
anonymization time is higher than the other schemes. However, it continues to have
only linearly increasing anonymization time even for higher anonymity levels, thus
showing that the scheme is effective and scalable. Figure 3(b) shows values of de-
anonymization time for the DRC approach. Here we consider only the DRC scheme
as only the DRC scheme can perform de-anonymization. The basic variation trend
of the de-anonymization time is similar as the anonymization time. However, the de-
anonymization time for all anonymity levels is shorter than the corresponding anonymiza-
tion time as the anonymization process dynamically adds the null transition to avoid the
collisions during de-anonymization. Also, since metadata helps record the collisions,
the de-anonymization process directly resolves the collision and it results in a shorter
de-anonymization time. In Figure 3(c), the relationship between anonymity level and
relative spatial resolution (RSR) is given. Instead of picking segments from the adja-
cent segment set, RS randomly selects segments from the whole area defined by the
maximum spatial resolution, which gives larger cloaking region, compared with RNE
and DRC. Also, we see that the relative spatial resolution of DRC is very close to RNE,
especially for higher anonymity levels. Both of the two algorithms pick segments from
the adjacent segments of cloaking region, so the structure of the cloaking region is
tighter. In Figure 3(d), success rate for the three schemes with varying anonymity level
is measured. Among the three schemes, RS always gets the highest success rate. This
is an inherent feature of RS because it succeeds in all cases unless the number of users
within the whole area defined by maximum spatial resolution cannot satisfy the required
anonymity level. Therefore, the success rate of RS can be seen as the upper bound of all
the anonymimization schemes. Compared with RNE, the success rate of DRC is closer
to the performance of RS. Though the success rate for all the three schemes slightly de-
creases for increased anonymity level, the overall success rate of the proposed scheme
is significantly high. It can be seen that even for the highest anonymity level, the success
rate of RNE is higher than 80% and that of DRC is higher than 92%.
5 Related Work
As location privacy is gaining more attention, several research efforts on location pri-
vacy were made in recent years. Various models of privacy protection systems have been
proposed to support privacy-preserving and efficient data communication between mo-
bile clients and servers, including client/server models [4], trusted third party models [5,
13, 19] and distributed models [7, 8]. While the client/server model is simpler to imple-
ment, due to the lack of global knowledge in client side, the protection cost is in general
higher with lower protection quality. For the distributed model, a decentralized cooper-
ative p2p network is deployed among clients, which requires high overhead to support
the infrastructure of communication and movement of clients. In contrast, a trusted third
party anonymizer model, such as the one used in our work yields good performance in
both query processing quality and computation cost. Various privacy protection algo-
rithms proposed for data privacy have been adopted for protecting location privacy of
mobile users. The types of privacy protection algorithms include anonymization [1, 5, 8,
10, 13, 20], data suppression [18], trajectory inference prevention [2, 3, 14–16] and en-
cryption [11]. While most of the existing schemes are aimed at preventing the adversary
from distinguishing the location of a given user from that of other users, their pertur-
bation techniques are mostly unidirectional and lack the ability to de-anonymize the
perturbed information even when a user accessing the information has suitable creden-
tials for obtaining finer information. ReverseCloak algorithms proposed in [12] provide
support for multi-level privacy control with the ability to reduce the granularity of the
perturbed location based on access credentials. However, in contrast to this proposed
work, the approach in ReverseCloak is to perform the location cloaking in a collision-
free manner by avoiding the possible segment expansions that may lead to collisions.
The cloaking algorithm proposed in this paper takes an alternate approach of allow-
ing collisions to happen during the cloaking expansion process and resolves them with
the help of metadata information during the de-anonymization process. While avoiding
collisions during cloaking expansion avoids the overhead of metadata management, the
approach of collision resolution using metadata can be more efficient in terms of lower
anonymization and de-anonymization time overhead.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we present a de-anonymizable location cloaking scheme for protecting
location privacy in mobile computing system. Unlike existing location cloaking tech-
niques which are developed as unidirectional location perturbation algorithms, the dy-
namic reversible cloaking algorithm proposed in this paper can restore the original lo-
cation information from the perturbed cloaking region when suitable access credentials
are provided. Our experiments based on GTMobisim show that the proposed cloaking
scheme is efficient and scalable. In our future work, we plan to apply the reversible
cloaking algorithm developed in this work to protect continuous location-based queries
which require continuous exposure of location information leading to possible correla-
tion attacks.
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